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Abstract
In housing markets there is a trade-off between selling time and selling price, with pricing strategy
being the balancing act between the two. Motivated by the Home Report scheme in Scotland, this
paper investigates the role of information symmetry played in such a trade-off. Empirically, this
study tests if sellers’ pricing strategy changes when more information becomes available and
whether this, in turn, affects the trade-off between the selling price and selling time. Using hous-
ing transaction data of North-East Scotland between 1998Q2 and 2018Q2, the findings show that
asking price has converged to the predicted price of the property since the introduction of the
Home Report. While information transparency reduces the effect of ‘overpricing’ on selling time,
there is little evidence to show that it reduces the impact of pricing strategy on the final selling
price in the sealed-bid context.
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Sellers in housing markets face a trade-off
between selling time and selling price, and
pricing setting plays a crucial role in the sell-
ing process (Anglin et al., 2003; Arnold,
1999; Knight, 2002). A high asking price
may signal a high reservation price, thereby
generating higher bids; it may also discou-
rage participation by potential buyers and
result in a longer time-on-market (Anglin
et al., 2003; Arnold, 1999; Yavas and Yang,
1995). A low asking price may attract more
potential buyers, but it also reduces the
probability of achieving high selling prices
(Anglin et al., 2003; Arnold, 1999; Deng
et al., 2012; Horowitz, 1992; Knight et al.,
1994; Yavas and Yang, 1995).
Housing markets are also characterised
by information asymmetry between sellers
and buyers (Clapp et al., 1995; Knight et al.,
1994; Levitt and Syverson, 2008). However,
housing markets have become increasingly
transparent regarding the information pro-
vided because of the development of technol-
ogies as well as institutional efforts (Chau
and Choy, 2011; Eerola and Lyytikäinen,
2015; Pope, 2008). In the UK, schemes such
as the Home Information Pack (HIP) in
England and the Home Report in Scotland
were introduced in the late 2000s to improve
information transparency in housing trans-
actions. These movements indicate a trans-
formation from ‘caveat emptor’ (let the
buyer beware, sellers have no duty of infor-
mation disclosure) to ‘caveat venditor’ (let
the seller beware, sellers are liable for non-
disclosure) rules (Chau and Choy, 2011).
This paper aims to empirically investigate
how pricing strategies and the trade-off
between selling price and selling time are
affected by such institutional changes in
Scotland.
The rest of the paper is organised as fol-
lows. The next section discusses the back-
ground of the Scottish housing markets.
Literature on pricing strategy in the sealed-
bid context is reviewed in the following sec-
tion, and the case study area and data are
described in the fourth section. Section
‘Empirical models’ discusses the empirical
strategies in the paper, and empirical results
are subsequently presented in the penulti-
mate section. The final section concludes the
paper.
The sealed-bid system and the
Home Report in Scotland
In Scotland, most properties for sale are
listed in a sealed-bid system, where the
‘offers over’ asking price is usually set below
the seller’s reservation price (Pryce, 2011).
The system appears to be advantageous to
sellers as it seeks to maximise the economic
rent1 (Gibb, 1992); consequently, the sealed-
bid system is the dominant selling mechan-
ism, particularly in market upswings. Other
selling mechanisms such as ‘fixed price’ or
‘price around’ are used when sellers are
under pressure to sell and/or properties are
of lower quality.
In the market peak of the mid-2000s, set-
ting artificially low asking prices to create
competition amongst buyers was a common
practice in Scotland. Such practice was criti-
cised for leading people who could not
afford the properties to pay for surveys,
contributing to house price instability (Smith
et al., 2006), while others argued that the
low-asking-prices practice would not
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determine the pace or direction of the mar-
ket (Levin and Pryce, 2007). With the objec-
tives of improving information transparency
and market efficiency, and to address the
problems associated with artificially low ask-
ing prices, the Scottish government intro-
duced the Home Report scheme in 2008
(Black et al., 2015). Since 1 December 2008,
the scheme requires home sellers2 to provide
a Single Survey,3 an energy report and a
questionnaire4 when listing dwellings on the
market. Sellers are responsible for the costs
of the Home Report, and potential buyers
can access the report free of charge.
Pryce and Gibb (2006) suggest that the
scheme is unlikely to alter sellers’ benefits,
but the authors are unclear about potential
changes in sellers’ behaviours. Based on sur-
vey and public consultation data, the
Scottish government’s review finds that the
scheme met the objectives, particularly in
addressing the issue of artificially low asking
price, but, as the authors point out, ‘poor
market conditions have also played a role’
(Black et al., 2015: 6). On the contrary, other
research commissioned by the Scottish gov-
ernment suggests little change in price-
setting practices since the introduction of the
Home Report (Robertson and Blair, 2014).
Recently, the emphasis on comprehensive
information has been extended to the private
rental sector in Scotland with proposals to
include the Home Report in tenement regu-
lations (Sottish Government, The, 2019).
Conceptualising pricing strategy
in the sealed-bid context
The rationale of setting a low asking price in
the sealed-bid system has been explained in
several studies. Low asking prices maximise
uncertainty by contributing to a larger var-
iance in the asking–selling price differences
in a submarket (Pryce, 2011; Smith et al.,
2006), which, in turn, may be perceived as an
indication of strong growth in selling prices.
Estate agents are incentivised to reinforce the
perception of a buoyant market by advising
on low asking prices (Pryce, 2011). Such a
strategy is less effective during market down-
turns as sellers are more likely to accept the
first bid that meets or exceeds their reserva-
tion price, and a low asking price could sig-
nal a lower bargaining position (Thanos and
White, 2014).
It is also important to distinguish between
the private and common values in the auc-
tion context. Sellers determine pricing strat-
egy according to their private values based
on the acquisition prices, housing attributes
and selling prices of properties nearby. The
‘common value’ element refers to market
professionals’ information on the submar-
ket, on which they base their advice to sell-
ers on pricing strategies (Thanos and White,
2014). Pryce (2011) measures the ‘common
value’ element by calculating the dispersion
of asking–selling price spread in a submar-
ket. A larger dispersion indicates a weaker
‘common value’ element or a weaker ‘loca-
tional convention’. Empirical studies find
that with a weaker common value element,
time-on-the-market (TOM) is more sensitive
to pricing strategies (Pryce, 2011), and both
optimal list price and selling price are higher
(Deng et al., 2012).
Imperfect information in the housing
market results in some elasticity in the
demand curve for the individual dwelling
(Maclennan et al., 1987). In a rapidly inflat-
ing environment, increasing prices contrib-
ute to information asymmetry by ‘fracturing
the flow of information which is so critical
to the operation and clearing of markets’
(Smith et al., 2006: 90). Levitt and Syverson
(2008) argue that information asymmetry
has resulted in greater pricing distortions
and find that estate agents with superior
information tend to sell their own properties
at higher prices. Rutherford et al. (2007)
show similar conclusions. Auction literature
also shows that standard auctions are only
3390 Urban Studies 58(16)
revenue-maximising when buyers are sym-
metric and have independent private valua-
tions, but when buyers have interdependent
valuations, auctions lose this advantage
(Campbell and Levin, 2006; Wang, 1993).
Before the Home Report was introduced,
asking prices acted as signals to potential
buyers that facilitated the narrowing of their
search (Anglin et al., 2003). With the Home
Report, valuations are more likely to act as
reference prices for buyers (Black et al.,
2015). As suggested by Ariely and Simonson
(2003), when salient reference prices are
available, the influence of starting price on
the final selling price in an auction
diminishes. In the Scottish context, a Home
Report valuation also indicates the collateral
value for mortgage purposes, thereby redu-
cing the level of financing uncertainty for the
buyers. Hence with the Home Report, there
seems to be little incentive for the sellers to
set an asking price that differs hugely from
the valuation. The first empirical objective of
this paper is to examine whether the intro-
duction of the Home Report has had a sig-
nificant impact on sellers’ pricing strategy.
If the Home Report has changed sellers’
pricing behaviours, would it also have an
impact on the trade-off between selling price
and selling time? Nanda and Ross (2012)
show that sellers who disclose more informa-
tion tend to achieve higher selling prices. In
Pope (2008), the disclosure of negative infor-
mation (such as airport noise) reduces selling
prices. Similarly, Chau and Choy (2011) find
that properties affected by highway noise
are sold for less under the ‘caveat venditor’
rules. The empirical evidence on TOM is
mixed. Findings in Wong et al. (2012) imply
that information symmetry reduces TOM.
Supported by empirical results, Levitt and
Syverson (2008) show that sellers with super-
ior information stay on the market for lon-
ger at a higher selling price. Rutherford
et al. (2007) find that information asymme-
try has little impact on TOM. The second
empirical objective of this paper, therefore,
is to investigate the impact of information
transparency on the trade-off between sell-
ing price and TOM.
Case study area and data
The study uses residential property transac-
tion data from the Aberdeen Solicitors
Property Centre (ASPC). The ASPC primar-
ily serves as a central marketing place for
residential properties in North-East Scotland
and captures approximately 90% of total
transactions in the region. The data set cov-
ers the housing market in Aberdeen city,
Aberdeenshire and a small part of Angus
adjacent to Aberdeenshire from 1984Q2 to
2018Q2.5 Table 1 shows the description of
all variables in the data set. Owing to the
availability of the variables postcode and
geocodes, the analysis focuses on the period
between 1998Q2 and 2018Q2 with just over
145,000 observations.6 The descriptive sta-
tistics of these variables are presented in
Table 2.
In addition to the geocodes and post-
codes, the data set includes 80 geographical
areas, which are neighbourhoods and towns
defined by the ASPC. Potential buyers can
filter their search by these areas on the
ASPC’s website, and they are used as the
predefined submarkets in this study.7
When the Home Report was introduced
in December 2008, most UK housing mar-
kets were experiencing a dramatic downturn
as a result of the global financial crisis.
However, house prices in the study area were
less affected by the financial crisis because
the region’s economy is predominantly influ-
enced by the oil and gas sectors. As shown
in Figure 1, compared with house prices at
the national level, prices in the Aberdeen
housing market (measured by the left-hand
side vertical axis) recovered relatively
quickly after the 2007 financial crisis and
reached another noticeable peak in 2015.
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Subsequently, prices in the Aberdeen area
started to decrease as a result of the signifi-
cant fall in oil prices in late 2015, while
prices in the rest of the country continued
to increase. This shows the peculiar nature
of the Aberdeen housing market given its
independent market cycle associated with
the oil industry. The case study area allows
pricing strategy to be compared before and
after the introduction of the Home Report
without the concern of the potential simul-
taneous effect of a market slump. The data
set also covers a relatively long period with
more than one property cycle, which is use-
ful for investigating the effect of market
buoyancy on pricing strategy.
Figure 1 also shows the average
Price premiums for ‘offers over’ and ‘fixed
price’ transactions (measured by the right-
hand y axis). Price premiums for both selling
mechanisms were relatively small in the late
1990s and early 2000s but they started to
increase substantially during the market
boom leading to 2007, followed by a fall dur-
ing the global financial crisis (2007Q2). But
it was not until 2009Q1 (just after the intro-
duction of the Home Report) that the pre-
miums shrank significantly. Since then, the
average ‘offers over’ premium has fluctuated
but remained small (less than 8%), and the
‘fixed price’ premiums have shown much less
variation.
Table 1. Descriptions for the variables in the data set.
Variable name Description
Pi Final transaction price of each property i
Pai Initial asking price of each property
Pricepremium Pi  Pai
 
Pai
x Spatial coordinate (latitude) of the property
y Spatial coordinate (longitude) of the property
Postcode Full postcode of the property
Numpublic Number of public rooms (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or more than 4); including lounge, living
room, drawing room, family room, kitchen, etc. Studio flat would have 0 public
rooms
Numbedrooms Number of bedrooms (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or more than 4)
Numbathrooms Number of bathrooms (1 or more than 1)
Heating A binary variable to indicate whether the property has central heating
Ensuite A binary variable to indicate whether master bedroom has an ensuite
Garage0 A binary variable to indicate whether the property has no garage
Garage1 A binary variable to indicate whether the property has one garage
Garage2 A binary variable to indicate whether the property has more than one garage
Garden A binary variable to indicate whether the property has garden(s)
Flat A binary variable to indicate whether the property is a flat
Non-detached A binary variable to indicate whether the property is semi-detached or terraced
Detached A binary variable to indicate whether the property is detached
Newbuild A binary variable to indicate whether the property is newly constructed
TOM Time on the market in weeks, computed as the duration between the listing date
and sold date
Offersover A binary variable to indicate whether the property is listed as ‘price over’, ‘offers
over’ or ‘price above’
Dec2008 A binary variable to indicate whether the property is listed on or after
1 December 2008
Sold A binary variable to indicate whether the property is successfully sold, = 0 if
property was withdrawn
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Empirical models
As highlighted in section ‘Conceptualising
pricing strategy in the sealed-bid context’, this
paper has the following empirical objectives:
I. to test if the introduction of the Home
Report has a significant impact on sell-
ers’ pricing strategy; and
II. to examine the influence of the Home
Report on the trade-off between the sell-
ing price and selling time.
Estimating the price of a property
Pryce (2011) suggests that ‘perhaps buyer/
seller beliefs about a property’s value are
based on simple rules of thumb that are best
approximated by a fairly rudimentary hedo-
nic model . valuers’ ‘‘professional judge-
ment’’ may in fact boil down to a fairly
simple set of intuitive rules’ (p. 775). The
paper starts with a baseline log-linear hedo-
nic specification presented in Model (1):
lnPi =ai +bXi + gGeocodei + E i ð1Þ
where lnPi is the natural logarithm of the
transaction price for property i, and Xi
includes all the physical attributes and quar-
terly dummy variables that represent the
time of transaction. To smooth the geogra-
phical differences in properties, Geocodei,
consisting of the standardised8 spatial coor-
dinates and their cross products, is included
(Bracke, 2015; Bracke et al., 2017; Jackson,
1979).9 The random error is E i, which is the
stochastic disturbance term from a normal
distribution of N 0,s2ð Þ:
The use of geocodes does not necessarily
fully capture the locational effects concern-
ing neighbourhood qualities. Some house
price studies conceptualise the location of a
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables in the ASPC data set, 1998Q2–2018Q2.
Variable N Mean/% Std dev. Min Max
Pi 128,380 164,951.1 116,300.2 6000 3,070,000
Pai 147,452 162,405.9 122,010.6 8000 3,500,000
Pricepremium 128,236 0.08 0.14 21 3
x 146,706 0.00 1.00 24 4
y 146,706 0.00 1.00 27 2
Numpublic 147,339 1.59 0.87 0 14
Numbedrooms 147,339 2.60 1.20 0 18
Numbathrooms 147,339 1.06 0.51 0 10
Heating 147,339 0.85 0.36 0 1
Ensuite 147,339 0.22 0.42 0 1
Garage0 147,339 0.46 0.50 0 1
Garage1 147,339 0.22 0.41 0 1
Garage2 147,339 0.32 0.47 0 1
Garden 147,339 0.71 0.45 0 1
Flat 147,339 0.40 0.49 0 1
Non-detached 147,339 0.31 0.46 0 1
Detached 147,339 0.29 0.45 0 1
Newbuild 147,339 0.01 0.10 0 1
TOM 147,339 17.92 27.26 0 745.71
Offersover 147,339 0.62 0.49 0 1
Dec2008 147,339 0.45 0.50 0 1
Sold 147,339 0.87 0.34 0 1
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property using fixed locational attributes
(Orford, 2002). For example, Bracke et al.
(2017) include fixed effects at the street level
in their hedonic model. In this paper, Model
(2) captures the fixed locational effect at sub-
market level:
lnPi =ak +bXi + gGeocodei + E i ð2Þ
where ak captures the neighbourhood fixed
effect.
Many also argue that housing market
dynamics operate at different spatial levels
and hedonic models should allow for the dif-
ferences in prices caused by such locational
externalities (Gelfand et al., 2007; Goodman
and Thibodeau, 1998; Jones and Bullen,
1993; Leishman, 2009; Leishman et al., 2013;
Liu and Roberts, 2012; Liu et al., 2018;
Orford, 2000). These studies propose multile-
vel models, in which house prices are mod-
elled using property-level attributes and
higher spatial-level attributes to allow for the
potential differences in the intercept term
and housing attributes at different spatial
scales. Using neighbourhood as an example,
the multilevel model assumes that neighbour-
hoods in the data set are a random sample of
larger population neighbourhoods, and the
coefficients for the neighbourhood effects
vary randomly around an overall mean
(hence referred to as the ‘random effect’).
Model (3) illustrates such hierarchical spe-
cification for the ASPC data: at the individ-
ual property level (level 1), price is assumed
to be determined by physical attributes and
location (measured by geocodes). Notably,
the ASPC data set does not have dwelling
age. Full postcodes may capture some of the
age effect, as properties with the same post-
codes tend to be constructed around the
same time.10 The use of postcodes also cap-
tures fine-grained spatial units of geography
(Leishman et al., 2013). Dwellings with the
Figure 1. Asking–selling price premiums and average real house price in Aberdeen housing market and
Scotland 1998Q2–2018Q2.
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same postcodes are grouped at level 2, and
at level 3 postcodes are nested within sub-
markets as in Model (3).
lnPijk =aijk +
X
bjkXijk + E ijk ð3Þ
where i= 1, 2, . . . , n individual properties at
level 1; j= 1, 2, . . . , n postcodes at level 2;
and k = 1, 2, . . . , n spatial submarkets at
level 3. For simplicity, Xijk denotes all the
attributes and quarterly dummy variables at
property level.
At level 2, the random intercepts and




where aijk is the group mean aj at postcode
level j, plus a varying difference ma, j for each
postcode. Similarly, each coefficient bijk is
considered as an average slope at postcode
level bj plus a variation from postcode to
postcode mb, j.
By the same token, the random intercepts




where ajk is the group mean across all
groups (postcodes nested in submarkets),
plus a varying difference majk for each nested
group. Slope bjk is the group mean across all
nested groups plus a variation amongst the
tested groups mbjk. The structure assumes
that not only could house prices vary
amongst postcodes within a submarket but,
also, the value placed on a detached house
or a semi-detached house, for example, may
vary between postcodes and submarkets.
This first stage of selling prices modelling
is important because misspecifications could
result in misleading estimates of the pricing
strategy variable in the next stage (Pryce,
2011). The multilevel model recognises the
potential locational structure of the data;
thus it has the capacity to improve predictive
power, reduce spatial dependence, capture
heteroscedasticity and allow explicit model-
ling of the influence of submarkets
(Leishman, 2009; Leishman et al., 2013;
Orford, 2000, 2002). However, the model
does not account for sellers’ heterogeneity,
which could cause unexplained residual in
the hedonic specifications (Glower et al.,
1996). Furthermore, the group-level effects
may simply reflect the misspecification of or
unaccounted for individual-level predictors
(Diez-Roux, 2000; Gelman, 2006), and this
limitation is particularly relevant to this
study, as omitted variable bias can be pres-
ent at the property level. Indeed, many have
argued that multilevel models are unable to
fully capture all spatial processes in house
price data (Chaix et al., 2005; Chasco and
Le Gallo, 2012; Hu et al., 2019). Another
potential issue with multilevel models is that
the interrelationships between variables at
different levels are not fully examined; for
instance, it is possible that property-level
attributes may influence group characteris-
tics; and vice versa (Dedrick et al., 2009;
Diez-Roux, 2000).
Pricing strategy
In the following equation, the asking price is
compared with the estimated prices from the
hedonic models to indicate pricing strategy





where lnPai is the natural logarithm of asking
price, and lnPei is the log of the estimated
price of the property.
Section ‘Conceptualising pricing strategy
in the sealed-bid context’ highlights that the
sellers’ pricing strategy is influenced by mar-
ket conditions, the locational convention of a
submarket and selling mechanisms. First, to
control market conditions, variable AvgTOM
is calculated as the average TOM of sold
properties within the last 13 weeks in sub-
market k.12 The longer that recently trans-
acted properties took to sell, the less the
asking price is expected to deviate from the
estimated price of the property. Variable
Sold% is calculated as the proportion of sold
properties within the last 13 weeks in a sub-
market. The larger this proportion, the more
buoyant the market. Second, to quantify the
locational convention, sik is calculated as the
standard deviation of the selling–asking price
premium of recently sold properties in the
same submarket within the last 13 weeks:
sik = SD pricepremiumi, kð Þ:
A small sik indicates a stronger ‘locational
convention’, and a large sik implies ‘noise’
in price premiums in recent transactions.
The ‘noisier’ the recent transactions, the
higher the level of uncertainty and the more
likely an asking price would deviate from
the estimated price of the property. Finally,
a dummy variable Offersover is used to dif-
ferentiate the two pricing strategies. Model
(4) is used to investigate the relationship
between Devi and the above variables using
an ordinary least square (OLS) specification,
and Model (5) allows further control for the
potential quarterly/seasonal fixed effect.
Devi = ci +vsik + uAvgTOMik +jSold%ik
+ tOffersoveri + e,
and ð4Þ
Devi = ct +vsik + uAvgTOMik +jSold%ik
+ tOffersoveri + e
ð5Þ
where ci is the constant for Model (4), and ct
captures the fixed effect in each quarter in
Model (5).
It is unlikely that equations (4) and (5)
can fully model the determinants of sellers’
pricing strategy. As pointed out by previous
studies, sellers’ motivation and behaviours
also play a critical role in housing market
dynamics (Anglin et al., 2003; Genesove and
Mayer, 2001; Yavas and Yang, 1995).
Studies have shown that factors such as the
expectation of capital gain (Ong and Koh,
2000), sellers’ characteristics (Springer, 1996),
sellers’ motivation (Glower et al., 1996) and
sellers’ original purchase price (Genesove and
Mayer, 2001) can all have an impact on pri-
cing strategy. As the ASPC data have no fur-
ther information on the sellers, it is impossible
to include such measures in Models (4) and
(5). Such limitations are further discussed in
conjunction with the empirical results in sec-
tion ‘Empirical results’.
Testing the effect of the Home Report
To indicate the introduction of the Home
Report, a dummy variable Dec2008 is gener-
ated. Dec2008 takes the value of 1 if
the property was listed with a Home Report
on or after 1 December 2008, and 0
otherwise. Dec2008 is then interacted with
AvgTOM , Sold%, Offersover and sik. If the
seller’s pricing strategy has indeed changed,
the coefficients of the interactive terms are
expected to have the opposite signs to the
coefficients yielded in Models (4) and (5).
Model (6) includes all these interactive vari-
ables using an OLS specification and Model
(7) includes the quarterly fixed effects:
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Devi = ci +vsik + uAvgTOMik +jSold%ik
+ gOffersoveri +
v0sik · Dec2008 + u0AvgTOMik · Dec2008
+j0Sold%ik · Dec2008 + t0Offersoveri
· Dec2008 + e
ð6Þ
Devi = ct +vsik + uAvgTOMik +jSold%ik
+ gOffersoveri +
v0sik · Dec2008 + u0AvgTOMik · Dec2008
+j0Sold%ik · Dec2008
+ t0Offersoveri · Dec2008 + e
ð7Þ
The trade-off between selling price and
selling time
The second empirical objective of this paper
is to examine the influence of the Home
Report on the trade-off between the selling
price and selling time. In the selling price
Models (8)–(10), Devi and Devi · Dec2008 are
included as regressors. As discussed in section
‘Conceptualising pricing strategy in the
sealed-bid context’, Devi is expected to have a
positive coefficient; however, the introduction
of the Home Report in theory should reduce
the magnitude of such effect because of
improved information symmetry.
lnPi =ai +bXi + gGeocodei +mDevi
+ kDevi · Dec2008 + E i,
ð8Þ
lnPi =ak +bXi + gGeocodei +mDevi




bjkXijk +mDevi + kDevi
· Dec2008 + E ijk:
ð10Þ
The final stage is to examine Devi and
the Home Report’s effect on selling time.
A parametric log-normal survival model
(Model 11) is used based on the assumption
that the probability of selling is higher when
a property is initially listed; the probability
to sell decreases as the property continues to
stay on the market (Pryce, 2011; Pryce and
Gibb, 2006). The survival model is specified
as:
lnt=b0 +b
T X + es ð11Þ
where e;N 0, 1ð Þ, and t is the surviving time
or TOM. All explanatory variables are
denoted by X , including physical attributes,
locational attributes, measures on market
buoyancy (sik ,AvgTOMik, Sold%ik) and pri-
cing strategies (Devi, Offersoveri), as well as
their interactive terms with Dec2008: The
parameters b0 and b
T from a sample of nU
uncensored observations and n nU cen-
sored observations are estimated by maxi-





lnf ti; b0; bð Þ+
Xn
i= nU + 1
lnS(ti; b0; b):
Overpriced properties are expected to have a
longer TOM. However, the more buoyant
the market, the shorter TOM is expected to
be. If the Home Report has changed the
liquidity of residential properties, the magni-
tude of Devi on TOM is expected to be
reduced as a result of the scheme.
Empirical results
Results for estimating property prices
The performances of Models (1)–(3) are pre-
sented in Table 3. The adjusted R2 for













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3398 Urban Studies 58(16)
87%,13 which is relatively high compared
with the results of similar models in other
recent studies.14 Most housing attributes
have the expected significant coefficients in
all three models; for instance, one extra bed-
room yields a 15%–23% higher selling price.
TOM has significant but negative coeffi-
cients, suggesting that for one extra week on
the market, the selling price decreases by
0.1%–0.2%. Geocodes and their cross prod-
ucts have significant coefficients at 0.1% sig-
nificance level.15 The random effect
parameters in Model (3) are all significant,
indicating significant differences in the inter-
cepts and coefficients at the postcode and
neighbourhood levels. Also, Model (3) yields
smaller coefficients for many housing attri-
butes compared with the OLS specifications.
In line with Orford (2002), this implies that
the coefficients in the OLS may be overesti-
mated if the hierarchical structure of the
data is ignored. Hence, predicted selling
prices generated by Model (3) are used in
the next few stages.16
The Home Report and pricing strategy
Table 4 displays the results of Models (4)–
(7) and shows that market conditions, loca-
tional convention and selling mechanisms
are significantly correlated to Devi. This
supports the discussion in the existing liter-
ature finding that sellers tend to set lower
asking prices with the sealed-bid system
when the market is buoyant and/or when
there is a high level of uncertainty. As
shown in columns 3 and 4, the introduction
of the Home Report appears to reduce the
effects of the four variables. For example,
the positive coefficient of AvgTOM is
almost offset by the negative coefficients of
AvgTOM · Dec2008. The interactive terms
with sik , offersover and Sold% all yield pos-
itive and significant coefficients. These
results support the view that sellers’ pricing























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































introduction of the Home Report, setting
asking prices that converge to the perceived
prices. Notably, the R2s for the models are
relatively low, implying that the issues
associated with omitted behavioural fac-
tors can be present. Hence, the paper can-
not conclude that the Home Report is
effective in addressing the problem of set-
ting artificially low asking prices.
The trade-off between selling price and
selling time
Consistent with previous studies such as
Anglin et al. (2003), Arnold (1999) and
Springer (1996), results of the price Models
(8)–(10) in Table 5 show positive and signifi-
cant coefficients of Devi. However, the inter-
active term (Devi · Dec2008) only yields
significant coefficients in the ‘fixed price’
sample, suggesting that only ‘fixed price’
selling prices are less sensitive to pricing
strategy as a result of the Home Report.
These are somewhat contradictory results to
those discussed in section ‘Conceptualising
pricing strategy in the sealed-bid context’,
finding that the influence of asking price on
the final selling price is likely to diminish if
salient reference prices are available.
There are four possible explanations for
such ‘puzzling’ results. First, this paper
implicitly assumes that agents are rational
and that they use current market price as the
reference point; but it does not consider
behavioural biases that can affect exchange
behaviour (Gallimore and Wolverton, 1997;
Paraschiv and Chenavaz, 2011). An example
of a behavioural factor is illustrated in
Genesove and Mayer (2001) and Einiö et al.
(2008), when a seller’s reluctance to realise a
housing loss can help explain their choice of
an asking price. In addition, factors such as
Loan-to-Value (LTV) put ‘an institutional
constraint on sellers’ behavior’, and ‘its
effect does not diminish with learning or
exposure to market conditions’ (Genesove
and Mayer, 2001: 1252), it is also possible
that such institutional constraint has not
changed with the Home Report. Second,
publicly available information may not be
adequately considered by buyers (Pope,
2008) and improvement of such information
symmetry may not affect the final selling
price. Third, the Home Report does not dis-
close all the information (for example, there
is no information on the neighbours or nui-
sance) and information asymmetry can still
exist. Finally, as mentioned before, there
might be misspecifications of the hedonic
models that misrepresent sellers’ bargaining
power (Anglin et al., 2003).
Results in Table 6 confirm the anticipated
positive correlation between overpricing and
TOM, which is in line with previous studies
(Pryce, 2011; Yavas and Yang, 1995). Also
as expected, properties are more liquid in a
buoyant market and ‘offers over’ properties
sell faster than ‘fixed price’ properties. The
highly significant coefficients of the interac-
tive terms Devi · Dec2008 and sik · Dec2008
confirm the proposition that the impacts of
pricing strategy and uncertainty on liquidity
were mitigated by the introduction of the
Home Report. The Home Report also seems
to accelerate selling time in buoyant market
conditions in the sealed-bid context.
Although there might be other factors that
influence selling time (for example, the
ASPC data do not observe changes in listing
prices), results in Tables 5 and 6 show some
evidence that improved information trans-
parency increases the liquidity of houses in
the sealed-bid context. Unlike the suggestion
by Pryce and Gibb (2006), these findings
imply that sellers could benefit from the
Home Report.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There has been a global trend in improving
information transparency in housing mar-
kets at an institutional level and this paper
set out to investigate the impact of such insti-
tutional changes on the trade-off between
selling price and selling time in the sealed-bid
context. The empirical results support the
view in the existing literature: improvements
in information symmetry appeared to influ-
ence sellers’ pricing strategy. However, while
the results suggest that the Home Report
reduces the effect of pricing strategy on sell-
ing time, this study did not find conclusive
evidence to support the view that the scheme
could reduce the influence of overpricing on
the final selling price. This finding implies
that although sellers bear the costs of the
Home Report, potentially they could benefit
from increased liquidity.
The paper has a wider implication for
policymakers globally. It highlights that
institutional factors do influence the beha-
viours of market participants. Both sellers
and buyers can benefit from a higher level of
information symmetry. Policymakers should
compare the monetary and social cost of
improving information transparency with
the benefits of such schemes and further
assess the usefulness of such schemes in
bringing market stability.
Inevitably, the study has some shortcom-
ings. First, there might be specification issues
surrounding the computation of predicted
Table 6. Survival analysis results (Model 11).
_t Coef. Std err. z P . z
Devi 11.75766 0.191556 61.38 0
sik 20.9594 0.083099 211.55 0
Offersover 20.31543 0.0076 241.51 0
Sold% 20.14908 0.067351 22.21 0.027
AvgTOMik 0.012892 0.000453 28.49 0
Devi3Dec2008 21.27077 0.074913 216.96 0
sik3Dec2008 1.174868 0.148909 7.89 0
Offersover3Dec2008 20.23107 0.010613 221.77 0
Sold%3Dec2008 20.91397 0.084383 210.83 0
AvgTOMik3Dec2008 20.00408 0.000585 26.97 0
Numpublic 0.008662 0.003735 2.32 0.02
Numbedrooms 0.05247 0.0032 16.4 0
Numbathrooms 0.045238 0.006131 7.38 0
Detached 0.138626 0.007753 17.88 0
Flat 0.1439 0.0082 17.55 0
Ensuite 20.04741 0.007456 26.36 0
Garage0 0.186301 0.007386 25.22 0
Garage2 20.02838 0.010997 22.58 0.01
Garden 20.09737 0.007726 212.6 0
Heating 20.12782 0.006936 218.43 0
Newbuild 0.543863 0.025329 21.47 0
Constant 29.80089 0.208085 247.1 0
ln
P




Prob . x2 0
3402 Urban Studies 58(16)
selling price, which in turn could misestimate
the pricing strategy variable. The study
attempted to address the problem using a
multilevel model in order to consider the
unobservable neighbourhood effects. Despite
the limitations of the OLS and multilevel
model, the models yielded reasonable good-
ness to fit and the results appear to be
robust. Nevertheless, the limitations of the
models should not be ignored. Second, the
pricing strategy is modelled using a simple
OLS regression with limited control over sell-
ers’ characteristics, so the prediction level of
the model was relatively low. This is an area
where further research is needed. There is
also more work to be done in the trade-off
between selling price and selling time.
Particularly, the study can be extended to
examine the behavioural factors of both sell-
ers and buyers. Third, there is a need to fur-
ther understand the role of TOM as a
determinant of equilibrium price in a ‘caveat
emptor’ context (Pryce, 2011). The process
of shifting from one selling mechanism to
another and the role played by TOM was
not explicitly examined in this paper. From
an institutional perspective, future research
should consider the implications for the total
information costs under the two distinct legal
regimes (caveat emptor and caveat venditor).
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Notes
1. The difference between selling price and
valuation (Gibb, 1992).
2. This includes all private properties listed in
the market, excluding ‘right to buy’ proper-
ties, and some of the new developments.
3. The Single Survey is a valuation equivalent
survey that shows the condition of the prop-
erty, the insurance rebuild cost and the esti-
mated market value, which is widely
accepted by lenders for mortgage purposes.
4. Questionnaires are completed by the sellers
regarding other information about the prop-
erty, such as the length of ownership, coun-
cil tax band, utility providers, whether there
have been alterations or extensions and
whether the property has been flooded.
5. Map of the housing market is available upon
request.
6. Unrealistic values are treated as data errors
and are excluded from the regression mod-
els. Transactions outside the Aberdeen rural
housing market boundary are also excluded.
7. A list of these areas is available upon request.







9. Pryce (2011) further develops this polyno-
mial estimation by interacting time, location
and attribute variables. His model yields a
R2 of 0.70. In this study, Model 2’s R2 is over
0.80; the results are further discussed in sec-
tion ‘Empirical results’.
10. When houses are constructed, developers
need to apply for new postcodes. The post-
codes hence tend to represent a street or part
of a street.
11. This follows the concept of DOP in Pryce
(2011) and Yavas and Yang (1995). Seller’s
pricing strategy is presented by comparing
asking price with the expected market price
in a given period.
12. Pryce (2011) uses a 3 km radius circle when
the standard deviation is calculated. This
paper argues that this circle does not corre-
spond to a submarket, particularly if the
Liu 3403
property is located on the edge of a neigh-
bourhood. Submarkets used in this study
consider community boundaries and are
more intuitive.
13. R2 is not available with Model (3).
14. For example, the adjusted R2s are 44% and
70% in the OLS model and multiple frac-
tional polynomial models, respectively, in
Pryce (2011).
15. Results are not listed in the table but are
available upon request.
16. Results from Models (1)–(3) subsequently
yield very similar results in Models (4)–(9),
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Eerola E and Lyytikäinen T (2015) On the role of
public price information in housing markets.
Regional Science and Urban Economics 53:
74–84.
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